The first Tariff Order of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) (March 9, 1999) has one basic objective -tariff rebalancing. This is derived from the recognition that 'enhancing efficiency and investment in telecom requires the introduction of competition, which in turn needs a regulatory mechanism to facilitate competition and fair play' and that, 'an essential ingredient of transition from a protected market to competition is alignment of prices to costs.' However, 'some deviation from cost-based prices is proposed at present in order to encourage access to and use of these services.' These deviations represent 'social obligations' usually referred to as 'universal service obligations.' 1 This paper discusses the TRAI's tariff rebalancing exercise in the context of economic principles of tariff regulation and regulatory practice. Economic theory provides two basic frameworks for price regulation -Ramsey prices and contestable market prices. Both these frameworks point to the need for taking into account demand side factors, in addition to costs, in setting prices, especially in a situation of significant joint and common costs. Neither of these approaches requires allocation of joint and common costs. However, regulators have been traditionally reluctant to set prices based on demand characteristics, especially demand elasticity's, and have preferred to set prices equal to fully allocated costs. In recent years, there has been a move away from historical and short-term costs to a cost concept described as Long Run Incremental Cost (LRIC) which uses forward looking costs taking into account expected changes in technology and productivity. A further development has been the use of 'price-caps' where the regulator specifies the average price increase for a basket of services. The flexibility for fixing individual prices is left to the operator, with prices often subject to caps and floors. The use of both LRIC and price-caps represents attempts by the regulator to provide incentives for improvements in efficiency and productivity.
The main problem in price regulation is the informational disadvantage of the regulator vis-a-vis the regulated firm. The principal-agent relationship between the two gives rise to the familiar problems of 'moral hazard' (hidden action) and 'adverse selec-tion' (hidden information). The regulator (as principal) would like to set prices that induce the regulated firm (the agent) to act in a particular way. For example, if the regulator knew what the firm's cost would be, and whether productively efficient, he could set prices to cover these costs and force the firm to be efficient in order to sustain itself. In practice, the regulator will never have enough information to use this approach. The regulator may be able to audit the firm's costs ex-post, but he cannot tell what they will be ex-ante, and he will never know what they might have been if the firm had taken actions to reduce them. In part, this is because an outside regulator will never know as much as the firm, but the firm itself may be genuinely uncertain about its cost ex-ante.
The TRAI's first tariff order points to the informational disadvantage of the regulator. The information problem is, in any case, likely to be severe in the initial stages of the transition to a regulatory framework. In the case of the TRAI, the problem is compounded by the fact that the Department of Telecommunication (DoT) continues to function as a government department. Without corporatization and commercialization, it is unlikely to be able to generate and provide the information required by the regulator. Moreover, price regulation assumes a commercial orientation on the part of the regulated firm, in the absence of which, regulation is unlikely to be effective.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 examines the economic arguments and the implementation problems associated with the two major approaches to pricing under natural monopoly in a multi product situation -Ramsey pricing and perfectly contestable market pricing. The implications of Ramsey pricing for two-part and multi-part tariffs are also discussed. The issue of cross-subsidies is discussed in the context of perfectly contestable market pricing. Section 2 discusses price-cap regulation which has emerged as the major alternative to the traditional rate of return regulation. This section also looks at the LRIC methodology currently being recommended and used by several regulators. Section 3 discusses the implications of financing universal service obligation (USO) for price regulation. Section 4 describes 'the essential elements of the TRAI's approach to regulation of basic and cellular services. Section 5 provides an assessment of the TRAI's approach and Section 6 concludes.
Approaches to Pricing under Natural Monopoly
Price regulation is considered necessary in the telecommunication sector because of "natural monopoly" conditions in the provision of certain services or facilities. While the natural monopoly condition argues for a monopoly supplier, an unregulated profit maximizing monopolist sets prices above marginal cost and earns excess profits. The objective of price regulation is to achieve, in a situation of natural monopoly, an outcome which is as close as possible to the perfect competition ideal.
In a s ingle -product situation, there are three possible approaches to pricing under natural monopoly:
1. The perfect competition outcome of price equals marginal cost. However, with economies of scale and decreasing average costs, price equal to marginal cost will imply price less than average cost and the operator will not 'break-even.'
2. Average cost pricing. While this achieves break even, it is a second best solution as it represents a deviation from marginal cost pricing and, there fore, loss of welfare.
3. An optimal two-part or non-linear pricing. In this case, there is a lump-sum access fee and a per unit usage charge. In some circumstances, this may result in the first best but generally only the second best will be achievable.
There are additional issues in pricing in a situation where the same telecom operator is providing several products, for example, local, national and international telephone calls, and network access. In addition, given the importance of peak load demand characteristics, peak and off-peak services must also be treated as different products. The approaches to pricing in the multi-product situation are:
1. Marginal cost pricing if the marginal costs of the different outputs could be identified, and if mar ginal cost pricing yielded sufficie nt revenue to cover total costs, including joint and other fixed costs. This is unlikely to be feasible in the presence of economies of scale and scope.
2. Ramsey pricing, also referred to as the inverse elasticity rule. In this case, different products are priced at marginal cost plus a mark up for each product which together is just sufficient to allow the firm to break-even. The mark-ups are inversely related to the elasticity of demand for the product so that they result in the minimum loss of welfare. However, elasticity estimates are difficult to obtain and the resulting prices in many situations may appear unfair on grounds of social justice.
3. Perfectly contestable market pricing. These are the prices that would prevail in a market with no sunk costs and, therefore, free entry and exit. This establishes a floor and ceiling for individual prices and a rate of return criterion for all prices taken together. It also provides a test for "cross-subsidy."
4. Cost-based pricing involving allocation of joint and common costs. While the allocation rules are usually arbitrary and without any economic foun dation, this methodology has found favour with regulators because of the perceived fairness.
The following sections discuss Ramsey pricing and perfectly contestable market pricing. Although Ramsey pricing is rarely used in practice, it provides a useful benchmark. It also provides valuable economic insights into price structures such as two-part tariffs and block rate or multi-part tariffs. Perfectly contestable market pricing provides a useful framework for analysing issues related to predatory pricing and cross-subsidies.
Ramsey Pricing
Ramsey pricing requires mark-ups over marginal cost which together is adequate to ensure break-even. Since the mark-ups result in deviation in consumption from the first best, the resulting loss in welfare is minimized by making the mark-ups higher in those markets with relatively lower price elasticities. In these markets, quantity demanded is least sensitive to price and the mark-up induces the least deviation in consumption from the first-best situation. The mark-up is lower in markets with higher price elasticities. The main significance of Ramsey pricing is that it points to the need for considering demand characteristics, in addition to costs, for setting prices.
Since Ramsey pricing requires detailed knowledge of not only the utility's cost but also the demand function, this approach is considered relatively difficult to implement. Ramsey prices may be unacceptable on equity grounds as well. By construction, Ramsey prices provide the greatest total consumer surplus, while allowing the provider to break-even. The distribution of this surplus among consumers is not considered. To the extent lower elasticity of demand is a result of lower income or associated with lower income, then these consumers will end up paying higher prices and enjoying lower surplus.
Two-part Tariffs 2
The Ramsey pricing rule can be used to address other pricing issues. In the single -product situation, instead of setting price equal to average cost, an access/usage tariff can be designed. If access demand is fixed and not sensitive to the access price, the usage fee is set at marginal cost and the access fee at whatever level is needed for the firm to break even when it minimizes cost. With usage price based at marginal cost, the first best consumption levels are attained. The access fee basically covers the fixed cost. This is also known as the Coase result (Coase, 1946) .
However, if access demand is price sensitive, then the firm must be seen as providing two goods -access and usage. The two goods have separate and interrelated demand and there is a marginal cost associated with each good separately. Without a break-even constraint, the first best optimality would be attained by setting the access fee equal to the marginal cost of access and the usage fee equal to the marginal cost of usage. In the presence of a break-even constraint, the second best solution would be Ramsey prices. These prices would depend upon assumptions about usage and access elasticity's.
While the two-part tariff increases total surplus relative to a situation of average cost pricing, it may hurt some consumers. For example, in the case of a normal good, higher income consumers will buy more units of the good than low income consumers. In this case, even though the total surplus is increased by a two-part tariff, some of the poorer consumers will be worse off. These consumers buy fewer units and charging a lump-sum fee makes them pay a higher effective price for their units or forces them to consume fewer units or even to drop out entirely. This outcome can be prevented by offering an optional two-part tariff. Consumers with low levels of consumption who are likely to drop out on account of the access fee would choose the uniform charge. Other consumers would choose the two-part tariff. The two-part tariff can be constructed in such a way that it is Pareto optimal. Prices in a Contestable Market 3 It is possible to work out the long run implications of the "free entry and exit" feature of competitive markets for prices of a multi-product firm. A market with "free entry and exit" has also been referred to as a contestable market. While a number of conditions has been suggested for contestability, the two important ones are that all producers have access to the same technology, and that there are no sunk costs. Even if the telecommunication industry is not perfectly contestable due to the presence of sunk costs, perfect contestability, like perfect competition, provides a benchmark for pricing under regulation. In a situation of perfect contestability, prices will be characterized by the following conditions: a) Prices cannot be less than the Average Incremental Cost (AIC).
The AIC of a service is defined as the difference in the firm's total costs with and without the service, divided by the output of the service. AIC assumes that capacity has been adjusted so as to minimize the average cost of the pertinent output. AIC includes any fixed cost that must be incurred on behalf of that product alone but does not include any contribution towards any fixed cost incurred in common with other services. In order to account for this exclusion, there is a combinatorial test that asserts that the prices of the firm must be such that the resulting revenue of every product by itself, and the combined revenue of every combination of the firm's products, must at least equal the corresponding AIC. In the combinatorial test for all the company's products, AIC will include all the fixed costs. This leads to the requirement that the company's total revenue from all its products must cover all its costs, including its cost of capital. Prices below AIC are sub-optimal for the firm because it results in reduced profits.
b) Prices cannot exceed Stand Alone Costs (SAC).
SAC of a product, or a combination of products, is the cost that would be incurred by an efficient entrant if it were to produce the product, or the combination of products. 4 Any price that exceeds the SAC will provide excess profits and, therefore, attract new entrants. This implies that the price of every combination of the firm's product must yield combined revenues not exceeding the corresponding stand alone cost of the combination of products in question. Applied to the full set of products supplied by the firm, this rule requires that the firm's total revenue must not exceed total cost.
Contestable Market Prices and Cross-subsidies
A set of prices is said to contain cross-subsidy if some consumers can improve their situation by defecting from the 'grand coalition' of consumers and forming a smaller coalition. This will be true if the prices charged to the 'defecting' consumers in the 'grand coalition' exceeds the stand alone costs of the smaller coalition. However, this violates the second condition of perfect contestability. Therefore, prices which satisfy the contestable market condition will also be subsidy free. It can be shown that if each group of consumers pays at least its incremental cost and the firm breakseven, then no group of consumers will pay more than its stand alone cost and there will be no incentive to defect and provide for its need on a stand alone basis.
In this context, it is important to note that prices can be below fully distributed cost and not represent a cross-subsidy so long as they are above the incremental cost.
The question of cross-subsidy arises in two contexts -predatory pricing and universal service. Predatory pricing involves a cross-subsidy of competitive services using revenues from monopoly services. It is in this context that the original tests for crosssubsidy were developed by Faulhaber (1975) . Crosssubsidy for universal service purposes is discussed in the section on universal service obligations!
Approaches to Pricing in Practice
The traditional approach to pricing has been the fully allocated cost methodology using the historic cost accounting convention. This has also been referred to as the rate of return regulation since the objective is to provide a fair rate of return on capital employed. Such prices are generally viewed as fair because every consumer pays her attributable costs and a share of the unattributable costs and the firm earns a fair rate of return.
The traditional cost plus rate of return regulation has been criticized on several counts: • There is little incentive to manage inputs efficiently or to adopt cost-reducing innovations.
• There is an incentive to misrepresent reported cost data.
• Prices based on fully distributed cost allocations are often inefficient since the allocations have no economic basis.
• The administration cost of regulation is substantial.
There have been two responses to these problems. The first is the use of forward looking costs best typified by the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC-the US telecom regulator) approach in the estimation of Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC). This is a specific application of a more general approach referred to as LRIC. This approach attempts to develop a cost benchmark based on forward looking costs for compensating the operator. An additional objective of this methodology is to minimize the cost allocation problem in a multiproduct setting. A second approach to the problem is the price-cap regulation introduced by the Office of Telecommunication (OFTEL) in the UK. This approach breaks the relationship between prices and actual costs. It also addresses the cost allocation problem by regulating the overall price of a basket Of services instead of regulating prices of individual services.
Price-cap Regulation
The traditional "cost-plus" rate of return regulation focuses on establishing a reasonable limit on the operators' profits. In contrast, a pure price-cap regulation is designed to break the linkage between the firm's costs and the process by which the regulator sets rates. The price-cap usually takes the form of an initial price index and annual retail price inflation minus X (RPI-X) adjustment factor. What this implies is that the price index for a defined basket of the firm's regulated products and services should increase by no more than the rate of RPI-X per cent per annum for a number of years. Therefore, average price must fall by at least X per cent in real terms. There may also be sub-price-caps for individual prices within the index.
The implementation of price-caps introduces several elements which make it similar to a rate of return regulation. Figures for revenues, costs, investments, and rate of return are still required to determine the price-cap. However, instead of using historical data, the process relies on forecasts. The incentive effects of price-cap regulation would, therefore, depend significantly on the nature of forecasts of each of the elements. Moreover, as in the case of rate of return regulation, there would be negotiations between the regulator and the operator, though on forecasts rather than the actuals and their reasonableness.
A related issue is that of the time period before a price-cap is reviewed. While the rate of return regulation requires an annual review, in practice, there is a 'regulatory lag' of several years. In the case of price-cap regulation, because of the built-in adjustment factors, the length of time between price reviews is longer. In fact, the length of time between price reviews is important for the incentive effect of pricecaps. Price-cap regulation implies that, given prices, operators have an incentive to incur expenditure to reduce costs since they get to retain the additional profits. If prices are reviewed frequently then, as with cost plus regulation, the incentives for cost reduction are weak since price tracks actual costs closely. If, on the other hand, the time period is long, then incentives for cost reduction are good, especially in the early part of the period, because in the short term, the firm retains any profit it can generate by keeping costs down. However, allocative efficiency may be poor towards the end of the period if prices are misaligned with costs, and incentives for cost reduction also weaken as the next price review approaches.
Regulating a multi-product firm by the RPI-X method gives rise to problems when the firm faces competition in some of its regulated product markets. If the average price constraint covers markets in which there is some actual or potential competition, incentives for an efficient pricing structure can be distorted. The average price constraint encourages the firm to undercut its rivals in the competitive business segments by allowing it to recoup the costs of doing so elsewhere. The price-cap can be supplemented with price floors and ceilings to check predatory behaviour through cross-subsidies.
LRIC Methodology 5
Both the FCC and OFTEL have been working with an LRIC methodology for the pricing of interconnection and unbundled elements. The methodology has been alternately referred to as Total Service LRIC (TSLRIC) or Total Element LRIC (TELRIC) depending on whether a service or a network element is being costed. The difference is not significant because the costing of services first requires the costing of network elements or components and then deriving the cost of services based on their use of the elements. The term long run in the context of LRIC refers to a period long enough so that all of a firm's costs become variable or avoidable. This approach ensures that rates recover not only the operating costs that vary in the short run, but also fixed investment costs. Incremental costs are the additional costs usually expressed as a cost per unit that a firm will incur as a result of producing an additional quantity of the good or service. The use of the term total is meant to emphasize that the relevant increment is the entire quantity of the service that a firm produces, rather than just a marginal increment over and above a given level of production.
In this methodology, incremental costs are forward looking and not historical or embedded costs. These are the costs that a carrier would incur in the future. In implementing this methodology, a decision has to be made whether costs should be computed based on the least cost, most efficient network configuration and technology currently available, or whether forward looking cost should be computed based on the incumbent's existing network infrastructures, taking into account changes in depreciation and inflation. 6 The methodology provides for the allocation of forward looking common costs across network elements.
In essence, TELRIC is a fully distributed cost methodology, but it is distributing forward looking costs, not the actual costs from management and accounting records. Since TELRIC allocates common costs, it is different from the AIC of the contestable market model which does not include any contribution towards any fixed cost incurred in common with other services.
Universal Service Obligations 7
Universal service obligation (USO) can be seen as a specific form of price regulation where certain groups of consumers are charged a price lower than the cost of providing service. These are usually consumers with low income or high cost for whom the service would not be 'affordable' at the cost of provision.
The possibilities for financing the USO are intricately tied to the market structure. The two structures of interest are:
• A monopolistic sector with a single operator.
• A partly or totally competitive sector.
With a regulated monopoly operator, there are essentially two options -financing from the general government budget or cross-subsidies. Most countries, including India, have followed the route of crosssubsidies. Cross-subsidies result in a deviation from efficient prices apart from the failure to target the relevant subscribers.
If there are several competing operators, then the financing mechanism may interfere with the very nature of the market structure that can be sustained in the sector. With several operators it is useful to distinguish between two settings. In the first case, the USO is imposed on one or more exogenously determined operators. Alternatively, the operator facing the USO can be endogenously determined, e.g., through an auction.
If the USO is to be imposed on a single specified operator, the choice usually falls on the incumbent monopoly operator. In this case, the USO is financed through cross-subsidies as in the monopolistic case. However, competition limits the ability of the operator to finance the USO through cross-subsidies. The relatively high prices for certain consumer groups or services leads to the well known problem of "creamskimming" by possibly less efficient competitors. This creates additional distortions and threatens the viability of the USO provider. However, the more fundamental p roblem with this approach is that it limits the tax base, i.e. the set of goods on which surcharges can be levied, in an artificial way. In light of optimal tax theory, this is likely to bring about a welfare loss.
The expansion of the tax base can be achieved if the USO is funded through implicit or explicit taxes 48 on the operators who are not subject to a USO. With appropriate design of the universal service taxes, the threat of cream-skimming can also be reduced. The contributions for universal servic e can be organized in several ways:
• A specific tax levied on the competitors' sales.
• Access surcharges can be levied if the competing operators have to use part of the USO operator's network. However, access surcharges may induce inefficient bypass and/or production inefficiencies.
• Lump sum entry fees, possibly determined through auctioning-off licenses to operate in the sector. The advantage of this approach is that it would not result in distorted prices. The entry fee will be treated as a sunk cost by the operator and not influence his pricing decision. However, it has the disadvantage of restricting entry.
The alternative to the exogenous designation is to determine the USO operator as a part of the financing mechanism. The regulator defines the USO and selects the operator for implementation on the basis of the lowest bid. The cost of the USO determined by the lowest bid can then be financed either through a transfer from the government or through a levy on all participating carriers. This system appears to have a number of advantages:
• It ensures that the USO is assumed by the most efficient operator.
• It avoids the disadvantages of cross-subsidies such as cream-skimming, inefficient bypass, and adverse impact on entry.
• It requires less information than alternative ar rangements.
Since this method relies on the auction mechanism, it requires a sufficiently large number of bidders to ensure that the lowest price is achieved and there is no collusion.
TRAI's Approach to Fixing Tariffs for Basic and Cellular Services
The TRAI's primary objective in its tariff order is to achieve cost-based tariffs for basic, cellular, and paging services as well as for interconnection. TRAI would like to use the concept of LRIC but given the lack of relevant information, it h as decided to use Fully Allocated Costs (FAC) as a starting point. As better information becomes available, prices would be based on incremental cost. According to the TRAI, "we have, in general, used forward looking costs for determi-nation of telecom tariffs. The attempt is to incorporate the impact of technological change on cost and efficiency, and hence on cost-based tariffs." 8 The following sections summarize the methodology followed by TRAI for costing and determining tariffs for basic and cellular services.
Basic Services
The TRAI has attempted to cost the various basic services by allocating all capital and operating costs across four categories -rental (or access), local calls, long distance, and international calls. The costs that are allocated are:
Capital Costs
The capital costs of the local network determine the cost of rentals. The costing uses a capital cost per line of Rs 31,000. This includes the cost of the local network as well as the long distance network. The cost of the local network is estimated at Rs 23,250 or Rs 25,000. The balance is the cost of the long distance network.
The capital cost per line estimate is based on a study by ICICI Consulting*, "Revenue Shortfall on Account of Uneconomic Subscribers in DOTs Fixed Line Network." Since DoT does not maintain any cost data centrally, it was collected from a sample of 10 secondary switching areas (SSAs). The data revealed that even though there is no significant variation across exchange systems, there is a wide variation in the capital expenditure across SSAs. The cost per Direct Exchange Line (DEL) ranged from a low of Rs 12,400 in Coonoor, Tamil Nadu to Rs 45,207 in Gwalior, MR The variation in cost was attributed to improper allocation of 'other costs' and due to differences in the geographical terrain. It was then decided to obtain 'updated' cost data from five SSAs, separately from rural and urban DELs. Ultimately, cost data from three SSAs, backed up by DoT officials' judgements, were used to arrive at the national level cost data.
The study also estimates the 'avoidable' capital cost on account of transmission links to the next higher exchange on the basis of the perspective plan document of DoT which estimates the annual transmission costs to be incurred for providing additional DELs projected for the period 1998-2007. The study arrives at a cost estimate of Rs 5,532 per DEL.
The capital cost is annualized using an Annual Recurring Expenditure (ARE) rate of 25 per cent-30 per cent. The ARE rate is based on a 10 per cent depreciation rate and a 20 per cent weighted average 'Report submitted to TRAI, 1998.
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cost of capital (WACC). The depreciation rate is based on informal estimates of the economic life of equipment of about ten years. The WACC is based on the capital structure and the cost of debt and equity of DoT and MTNL as shown in Table 1 . The ARE represents an annuity for ten years with the same present value as that of the cashflows resulting from a 10 per cent principal repayment every year and 20 per cent cost of capital. This methodology gives an estimate of cost-based rental of Rs 485 to Rs 625 per month.
The capital cost for long distance transmission is allocated between long distance and international calls (both incoming and outgoing) on the basis of minutes of traffic. This estimate is based on the ICICI estimate of transmission cost to the next highest exchange. An alternative estimate is obtained on the basis of the break-up of DoT's Annual Plan Allocations, 1992-93 to 1997-98 (Table A II .2 of Consultative Document). According to this, about one-fifth to one-fourth of the capital cost of the local network was accounted for by long-distance related capital costs.
Operating Costs
The DoT has provided figures for operating costs and the total number of metered calls for the year 1996-97. The basis of the break-up of operational costs between local and long distance is not provided. The exact break-up of the number of metered calls across the three category of calls is not available. Information on the minutes of international traffic is available from VSNL since this information is necessary for settlement of payments. The TRAI has estimated the number of Note: ICICI estimate was with 10 per cent return on debt. The TRAI has augmented the estimate by also considering a higher figure for a return on debt, i.e". 18 per cent.
Source: ICICI (as reproduced in the TRAI second consultation paper on tariffs dated September 9, 1998).
minutes of local and STD calls using informal estimates of pulse duration and distribution of total number of metered calls across the three categories as shown in Table 2 .
The operating cost for the local network is allocated across local, long distance, and international minutes of traffic since the local network is used by all calls. The operating expenses related to the long distance network is allocated between long distance and international minutes of traffic.
Capital and Operating Cost of VSN'L Operations
This represents the cost of international transmission and switching and is assigned exclusively to international call minutes. These costs are based on an ITU study on "The Changing International Telecommunications Environment: Country Case Study -India" prepared by Tarifica (UK) and IIMA (India) as given in Table 3 .
Determination of Rental and Usage Charges
Rental and usage tariffs have been determined in the following manner:
Rentals
The rentals proposed by TRAI are based on the actual current rentals, adjusted for inflation and increase in real GDP per capita, since rentals were last revised in 1993. There is a 50 per cent adjustment for the cumulative price increase for the period March 1993 to March 1999. An additional adjustment of 15 per cent is made for increase in real GDP per capita during this period. Therefore, the proposed rentals are not directly related to the estimated costs. This was Table 2: DoT's Operating Costs and Estimated motivated largely out of a concern of low user subscribers dropping out of the network at cost-based rentals.
Rental charges are increasing in the exchange capacity in b oth rural and urban areas. Consumers have been classified into three categories -low user, (up to 1000 calls bi-monthly), general users (all others), and commercial users (business subscribers, yet to be defined).
Local Calls
The tariff for local calls is based on the operational cost of the local network allocated to local calls. The call charge for the first 500 metered calls per month in a billing cycle for rural subscribers is less than the lowest estimated cost-based charge without any margin. The corresponding call charge for urban subscribers (again without margin or with a small margin) is equivalent to that estimated with average call holding time of 2.8 minutes. With a call holding time of 2.5 minutes, this tariff would be below cost. For calls in addition to the first 500 metered calls per month in a billing cycle, a margin of 20 per cent has been provided above the upper limit of the cost-based charge with holding time of 2.8 minutes. This also provides a margin on the upper limit of cost-based charge estimated for average holding time of 2.5 minutes.
Long Distance Calls
The tariff for long distance is based on the allocated costs of the local and long distance network as well as the cost of rentals which is not recovered through Range for Total Minutes of Local Call, 1996-97 rental charges. There are five distance slabs -from up to 50 km to above 1000 km. At pulse charge of Rs 1.20 per metered call, the rate per minute varies from Rs 1.20 to Rs 30.
International Calls
The tariff for international calls is based on the allocated costs of the local and long distance network, the excess of cost of rental over rental charges, the costs of international transmission and switching, and the 'settlement rate' payment to the foreign carrier.
A standard tariff package provides basic services at the tariffs specified in the schedule and includes the specified number of free calls. Different rentals prescribed for the three categories of subscribers imply that there are three different standard tariff packages in this schedule. Subscribers must have the option of getting basic services at the standard tariff package, i.e., at tariffs and free call allowance specified in the schedule. In addition, the service provider may offer "alternative tariff packages" to the subscribers. The subscriber shall be free to choose among various tariff and free call offers available. In the alternative packages, items for which tariffs are specified in terms of a ceiling will continue to be subject to the specified ceiling. Items for which a specific amount of tariff is shown in the schedule (e.g. rentals and call charges) may have any alternative tariff in the "alternative tariff package." Similarly, an alternative free call allowance may be provided in an "alternative tariff package." Table 4 presents a broad comparison of the new and old tariffs for basic services.
Cellular Services
TRAI is of the opinion that there is a need to regulate cellular services "until the cellular market matures." This is based on the fact that the total cellular subscribers are about 5 per cent of the total fixed line subscribers "with varying demographic and disposable incomes." Regulation would not be necessary once the market matures. "An indicator of the beginning of the mature phase could be when an operator is generating profits through a fast growing subscriber base and the subsequent increase in tariffs. In mature markets, it is generally accepted that cellular services compete with other mass market products for the consumers' disposable income. This process naturally intensifies competition, both within the sector and between sectors, thus, to a large extent, obviating the need for price regulation. Once this phase is reached or is imminent, the need to price regulate cellular services in India will be reviewed."
The TRAI has attempted to estimate the cost of access and airtime for fixing cost-based rentals and Notes:
1. The maximum rental is applicable for exchanges of 1 lakh capacity as opposed to 3 lakh before. 2. The pulse rate has been reduced from 5 to 3 minutes.
The maximum rate is applicable for calls in excess of 500 per month as opposed to 1000 per month earlier. airtime usage charges. The cost of access is based on the cumulative capital expenditure per subscriber. The cost of air time is based on operating expenses. There is no a priori valid reason for including the license fee in either cost category. If 100 per cent of the license fee is included in the cost of access, then the resulting access fee is considered to be too high. If instead it is included in the cost of airtime, then the resulting airtime charges are too high. The alternative of including 50 per cent of the license fee in access costs and the balance 50 per cent in airtime charges is considered acceptable.
The TRAI uses cost information provided by the cellular operators. A ctual data have been provided for 1996-1997 and 1997-1998 and projections have been made for the following four years. As shown in Table  5 , there is considerable variation between circles and metres and even within metres and circles there is considerable variation. The TRAI decided that, "in view of the data available for the circle operators and the quality of estimates emanating from it, the tariff proposals are based only on metro data." Rentals and airtime charges are calculated using the capital expenditure and operating expense forecasts for 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 as shown in Table 6 . The license fee is divided equally between the two cost categories. The monthly rental is arrived at by applying an ARE of 30 per cent "based on informal discussions with industry representatives which suggest that 30 per cent ARE is a reasonable basis for analysis."
Using the median estimate, the TRAI proposed a rental of Rs 600 (earlier Rs 156) and airtime charge of Rs 6 (earlier Rs 16.80) per minute. Both these are in the nature of price-caps. The airtime charge is for the peak period which is not to exceed eight hours. The off-peak rate should not exceed half the peak rate. The proposal also allowed alternative tariff packages, provided that price offered as part of a tariff package did not exceed the specified ceilings. The TRAI also proposed a 'calling party pays' (CPP) policy instead of the existing policy of mobile subscribers paying for incoming calls as well. This was done with a view to 'boost usage of the network.' In the final order, the TRAI made certain modifications to its proposals. The number of standard (equivalent to peak) hours was raised to 11 and tariffs for concessional (equivalent to off-peak) were required to be only less than (not less than half as proposed) the tariff for standard hours. The proposed price-cap tariffs of Rs 600 for rentals and Rs 6 per minute for airtime were converted into a "standard package" always available to subscribers. The operators were free to offer alternative packages with rentals and airtime higher than those in the standard package, subject to the general reporting requirement. However, in spite of requests by certain parties, the TRAI did not agree to differential tariffs for circles. "Although a differential tariff regime for metros and circles can be theoretically conceived, the authority, at present, favours a uniform tariff regime across the industry." The reasons for this preference are not spelt out. The TRAI also postponed implementation of the CPP system to August 1999 since 'the DoT has indicated that it will take some time to make the technical adjustments required to implement the CPP system.'
Comments on TRAI's Tariff Order
One of the factors behind the general move for tariff rebalancing/reduction is the profitability of DoT, According to the TRAI, "It is true that the DoT surpluses are significant but the authority's opinion is that at the present stage of India's telecom development, it is necessary for the DoT to have substantial surpluses for expanding the network and to meet other social obligations." It must be noted that even if DoT's surplus is considered large in absolute terms at about Rs 7,000 crore, in terms of return on capital employed, it is only about 20 per cent as shown in Table 7 . Moreover, this is on a pre-tax basis since the DoT does not pay any taxes currently. In terms of return on equity, the profitability of MTNL and VSNL, both with significant private shareholdings, is much higher. The impact of the tariff restructuring on usage patterns, i.e. the likely increase in the share of long distance and international calls, has implications for the cost allocation exercise carried out by the TRAI. The per minute costs calculated by using the prerebalancing mix of traffic are unlikely to be valid in the post-rebalancing period because of a significant change in the traffic mix. The order considers the impact of the rebalancing only on DoT's revenues. Its impact on costs and, therefore, profitability has not been considered. The TRAI believes that while the "volume of STD/ISD calls is likely to increase by at least 10 to 25 per cent, if not more," overall, with the exception of the first year, the tariff rebalancing is likely to be revenue neutral. As per the TRAI order, "In the first year of new tariffs, there is likely to be a surplus for the service provider. In the second year, there is likely to be a surplus or a small deficit. In the third year, the reduction in DoT revenues might be about 3 -5 per cent." However, given the likely increase in traffic, because of the higher elasticity of demand of STD/ISD, costs are likely to increase which could have a negative impact on profits. This points to the need for developing a model of profits rather than just revenues. Such a model will also have to take into account the possibility of improvements in efficiency of operations and corresponding reduction in costs. The tariffs in the order are based on existing costs without consideration for efficiency improvements.
The objective of 'universal service' has been addressed in two ways. First, rentals are kept below the cost worked out by the TRAI. This was done "mainly with the objective of making them affordable." The excess of rental cost over actual rental charge has been added to the cost of long distance and international calls. The authority has also devised a category of "low user subscribers" -those making up to 1000 calls bi-monthly. According to the TRAI, about 70 per cent of the subscribers fall in this category. The increase in rental for this category ranges between 30 to 40 per cent and will remain unchanged for the period April 1999 to March 2022. This would also be the first increase after 1993. Second, with regard to usage charges, for the first 500 calls, the charge is Rs 0.80 per call for rural areas and Re 1.00 per call for urban. For calls above 500 per month, the charge is Rs 1.20 per call. The creation of low-user category is likely to improve the targeting of universal service as compared to the earlier situation where low rates on the initial slabs were available to all subscribers.
The tariff order does not explicitly address the problem of financing universal service. The implicit assumption is that universal service will be financed through cross-subsidies. However, this ignores the distortion effects of cross-subsidies already discussed.
The tariff structure is based on the costs and traffic of a national monopoly operator which averages across rural/urban, residential/commercial, higher/ low income, and local/long distance segments. However, the private operators will be operating exclusively in a specific state with the sole restriction of 10 per cent rural connections. The private operators will, therefore, concentrate on the most profitable segments preventing DoT from averaging which forms the basis of the tariffs. Moreover, the cost of coverage is also likely to vary across geographical regions. In calculating tariffs for basic services, TRAI has not considered the impact of license fees as such and differential license fees in particular. In the case of cellular services, license fees have been treated as cost and the problem of differential license fees avoided by considering only the metros where the same license fee applies in all metros.
Overall, the TRAI is faced with a severe information problem which is unlikely to be resolved so long as the DoT continues to function as a government department with no commercially relevant management information system. Lack of information has forced the TRAI to use the FAC method instead of other more sophisticated methods. The tariff order is based on extremely tentative cost and usage information. The analysis uses ' representative' cost estimate for the current capital costs of the local network and long distance transmission network. Operating cost estimates are based on historical costs. Finally, allocation of costs are based on extremely speculative estimates of the number of minutes of local, STD, and international calls." The different estimates will have significant implications for the allocation of joint and common costs as well as per minute cost calculations. This problem of cost and usage data is likely to persist so long as the DoT is not corporatized and does not adopt a commercial accounting system and management information system. This may not be a severe problem at this stage given that the TRAI is mainly concerned with 'tariff rebalancing.' There is broad consensus that the cross-subsidies in the existing tariff structures is quite significant and any rebalancing would represent a move towards more cost-oriented rates. The TRAI is, therefore, unlikely to make significant errors in this regard. The more important concern is that the tariff rebalancing may impair the viability of the DoT, especially if the rebalancing is not accompanied by a restructuring of the DoT to make it more efficient.
Conclusion
The Indian telecom sector, perhaps, has the unique distinction of a government department being regulated by a regulatory authority. In most cases, the government department is at least corporatized with some time-frame for privatization, prior to regulation. This has several implications for price regulation. Price regulation, in general, and incentive-based regulation in particular, assumes a commercial orientation on the part of the regulated firm. This is not possible without at least coporatization of the D oT. Of course, corporatization by itself is unlikely to be adequate for commercialization if it is not accompanied by autonomy of operations and introduction of private shareholding. Without corporatization and commercialization, the DoT will be unable to produce the kind of information that is needed by the regulator for meaningful regulation. In fact, this is the same information that would be needed for efficient management of any commercial organization. 9 The estimate of domestic long distance minutes provides a good example of the problems with the TRAI's estimates. In its consultation paper on tariffs, the TRAI estimated the total number of minutes of long distance ranging from 8 to 11 billion minutes (page 66, para 53, Annexure 2) as of 1996-97. In contrast, its consultation paper on "Introduction of Competition in Domestic Long Distance Communications" provides an estimate of 26 billion minutes for 1998-99 (page 24, para 100, Table 3-8). This estimate is subject to certain caveats but these are unlikely to make a significant differ ence to the estimates.
Notes

